Swiss Base Company: Tax Avoidance Device for Multinationals by Braun, W. David
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 50 | Issue 4 Article 5
4-1-1975
Swiss Base Company: Tax Avoidance Device for
Multinationals
W. David Braun
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
W. D. Braun, Swiss Base Company: Tax Avoidance Device for Multinationals, 50 Notre Dame L. Rev. 645 (1975).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol50/iss4/5
NOTES
THE SWISS BASE COMPANY:
TAX AVOIDANCE DEVICE FOR MULTINATIONALS*
I. Introduction
Switzerland enjoys a unique position as one of the world's leading tax
shelters for multinational corporations. Three major components combine to
make Switzerland's tax climate attractive to multinationals. First, the average
Swiss corporate tax rate is considerably lower than that in the United States and
other European countries. Second, Switzerland has an extensive network of
double taxation treaties with other nations. Third, and most important, Swiss
tax law provides special privileges and even partial exemption from taxation to
foreign-held Swiss "base companies," which may be defined as companies designed
to concentrate profits from a multinational's worldwide operations in a low tax
jurisdiction. Together, these factors provide tax advantages which have attracted
many foreign corporations to Switzerland. However, such arrangements tend to
deprive other nations of tax revenue because profit is centralized in Switzerland
instead of being taxed outside Switzerland at a higher rate. As a result, many
countries, including the United States, have enacted laws to curb the attractiveness
of Switzerland as a tax haven; even the Swiss Government has taken steps to
prevent abuse of its tax shelter privileges. Such measures have partially reduced
Switzerland's tax shelter privileges. Yet its basic tax savings devices remain intact.
Therefore, Switzerland continues to offer an attractive tax climate for multi-
nationals wishing to defer taxes. This note examines the extraordinary tax savings
which may still be gained by a multinational corporation through the establish-
ment of a Swiss "base company."
II. Significance of the Swiss Base Company
In order to appreciate the significance of the Swiss base company as a tax
shelter device, it is important to grasp the desirability of concentrating the profits
of a multinational group in a nation with the lowest overall tax burden. The
multinational corporation, with income sources from many nations, each with
varying tax rates, can reduce its tax liability by pooling group profits in the area
of lowest taxation. The wisdom of this activity from the standpoint of profit
maximization is apparent. For instance, suppose a multinational parent corpora-
tion has its headquarters in the United States but has subsidiaries in several
foreign countries. If the profits of those subsidiaries are remitted directly to the
parent corporation, they are taxed at the United States rate of 48 percent.' But
if these same profits are remitted to a Swiss base company, they are then taxed
* Invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article has been made available by the
Union Bank of Switzerland. The author, however, takes sole responsibility for any errors.
1 INT. RIv. Coan oF 1954, § 11.
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at no more than the maximum Swiss rate of 30-40 percent2 and usually at a much
lower rate. The result is that a considerable tax saving is achieved. Earnings
which would have otherwise been lost as taxes are then held by the Swiss base
company. Of course, these profits kept in Switzerland are unavailable as divi-
dends to the multinational's parent corporation in the United States. However,
this pool of capital concentrated in Switzerland is available for new profitable
undertakings among the multinational group. W. A. P. Manser states the matter
succinctly:
It may well occur that a subsidiary, by reason of the success of its operations
in one country, may be enjoying a high level of profits. At the same time,
a subsidiary in another country may be embarking upon a new capital in-
vestment project, or may be encountering a period of transient financial
deficit. The surplus resources of the one company can be used to replenish
those of the other. In a typical group, simultaneous situations of this sort
will be present in different parts of the total network at any given time,
and will recur continuously .... What is required for the proper coordina-
tion and deployment of internally generated resources of this kind is a central
clearing house, or treasury.s
The Swiss base company acts as this central clearinghouse. If used to its fullest
advantage, the fund of capital pooled in the Swiss base company will grow as a
result of interest charges and fees paid to the base company by the multinational's
subsidiaries so that when the fund is ultimately returned to the parent corpora-
tion, the profit is greater than it would have been had the original profit been
remanded directly to the parent without interposition of the base company.
Thus, the Swiss base company achieves two objectives: First, it defers United
States taxes, permitting the multinational to pool its group profits; and second,
this pool is available for further profitable undertakings before it flows back to
the United States parent corporation and is taxed. The fact that many American
and German multinationals have established base companies in Switzerland for
these purposes attests to their usefulness and popularity. Attention now turns to
the Swiss tax concessions which enable base companies to achieve these objec-
tives
2 According to Dr. Kurt Locher, now Director of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration,
the average tax incidence for Swiss corporations was about 25-30 percent in 1962. Locher, Swiss
Measures Against Abuse of Tax Conventions, in INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL Docu-
MENTATION, SWISS MEASURES AGAINST ABUSE OF TAx CONVENTIONS 9 (Supplement to the
BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, Vol. XVI (1963)) [hereinafter cited
as Locher]. Swiss tax rates have risen somewhat since then. Now the maximum tax on corpora-
tions, depending on the canton, is roughly 30-40 percent. Interviews held with members of the
Swiss government, banking and business community, on file at the Notre Dame Lawyer Office.
3 W. MANSER, THE FINANCIAL ROLE OF" MULTI-NATIONAL ENTERPRISES, 106-07 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as W. MANSER].
4 Some excellent general discussions of Swiss taxes can be found in: ARTHUR ANDERSEN &
Co., TAX AND TRADE GUIDE: SWITZERLAND (1972) [hereinafter cited as ARTHUR ANDERSEN &
CO., SWITZERLAND]; UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND: FOUNDING A COMPANY IN SWITZERLAND
(1972); SOCIETi ANONYME FIDUCIARE SUISSE, TAXATION IN SWITZERLAND, n.d. [hereinafter
cited as TAXATION IN SWITZERLAND]; FEDERAL TAx ADMINISTRATION, THE FEDERAL, STATE
AND LOCAL TAX SYSTEM OF SWITZERLAND (1973); Bianchi, Swiss Taxes: national and inter-
national implications (with burden comparisons), JOURNAL U.E.C. (Special Edition, Autumn
1972); W. ALTORFER, FAcHSCHRIFTEN DER HANDELSKAMAIMER DEUTSCHLAND-SCHWEIZ-DIE
BESTEUERUNG VON AG. UND GmbH. IN DER SCHWEIZ (1970). For advantages of a base com-
pany, see generally W. MANSER, supra note 3, at 106-07 (1973). For a description of Swiss base
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III. Swiss Tax Concessions
Switzerland is a confederation of over two dozen separate and autonomous
cantons. Each canton is composed of municipalities which also retain a measure
of autonomy. All of these governmental units levy and collect taxes. The fed-
eral taxes have relatively minor impact on corporate income. The major tax
burden on corporate income is incurred at the lowest governmental levels, the
canton and the municipality. In 1970, for instance, over 80 percent of direct
taxes collected by all levels of government were collected by the cantons and
municipalities. Therefore, while the federal government grants some tax in-
centives attractive to base companies, the incentives having the greatest impact
on corporate taxes are granted by the cantons and municipalities. The nature
of these incentives differs greatly. Most incentives apply categorically to specific
types of corporate activity, but the amount of the incentive is dependent on
which canton or municipality is chosen as the corporate domicile 5
A. The Federal Level
In order to appreciate the significance of the federal tax concessions, an
examination of the Swiss federal tax structure is required. The basic federal tax
is known as the Federal Defense Tax, originally a temporary war measure enacted
to cover defense expenditures arising from the Second World War but now a
permanent source of federal revenue. The Federal Defense Tax has two com-
ponents: a tax on income and a tax on net worth. Because the cantons and
municipalities retain so much tax authority, the federal taxes of Switzerland are
low. The federal tax on income at its highest progressive rate is only 8.8 percent
and the flat-rate tax on net worth is only 0.0825 percent.
companies, see 13 EUROPEAN TAXATION 191-208 (1973); 2 EUROPEAtN TAXATION 19-32 (1962);
BNA, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 82-2d, U.S. BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND
(1972) [hereinafter cited as BNA, U.S. BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND]. For an excel-
lent general discussion of Switzerland as a business site, see CCH 1974 COMMON MARKET REP.:
DOINo BUSINESS IN EUROPE, 1 29,101.
5 ARTiIUR ANDERSEN & Co., SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at 1-7, 71-72, 118; 13 EUROPEAN
TAxATION 200 (1973); Interviews supra note 2.
6 The Federal Defense Tax (Eidgen6ssische Wehrsteuer; impOt federal pour la difence
nationale), has two components, one on income and one on net worth.
Income: The income tax element of the Defense Tax is a tax on income according to its
relation to the corporation's net worth. It is designed to impose a low tax burden on corpora-
tions with a small return on investment and a higher tax burden on corporations with a great
return on investment. Computation of the tax on income of a corporation with a net worth of
over SFr. 50,000 ($20,000) may be expressed as:
A. A minimum income tax of 3.3 percent;
B. On that part of total profit which exceeds 4.0 percent of net worth (defined as
paid-in capital plus reserves) an additional 3.3 tax is levied;
C. And on that part of total profit exceeding 8.0 percent of net worth, an additional
4.4 percent tax is levied;
D. But in any event the total tax may not exceed 8.8 percent of profit, which is
reached when profit equals or is greater than 22 percent of net worth.
Net worth: A flat-rate tax on net worth of 0.0825 percent is levied. Net worth is defined
as paid-in capital plus reserves. Bianchi, supra note 4 at 3-4; EUROPEAN TAXATION, Section A,
Switzerland-i, 2 (1974); 2 EUROPEAN TAXATION 19-24 (1962); ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO.,
SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at 71. The Federal Defense Tax is periodically reenacted for a
limited term. Under the present act, it will continue until 1982. Bianchi, supra note 4, at 4.
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These already low rates of tax are capable of further reduction through the
use of federal tax concessions which apply to base companies as well as ordinary
corporations that have holdings outside of Switzerland. First, the net worth tax,
levied on paid-in capital plus reserves, is not levied on foreign permanent estab-
lishments and foreign-situs real estate.7 This is not an extraordinary exemption.
It is granted on the theory that such property will normally be taxed in the foreign
country where it is located anyway.'
A second, and more significant, federal tax exemption known as the "sub-
stantial interest" exemption, reduces a Swiss company's tax base in proportion
to the income which it receives from a substantial interest in the capital of an-
other corporation. Since the normal tax base of a Swiss corporation for the
Federal Defense Tax is its worldwide income, the relief granted by the sub-
stantial interest exemption can be of major importance for a company whose in-
come sources are chiefly, if not entirely, foreign. The exemption will apply if
either of two substantial interest requirements is met:
(1) The Swiss company holds at least a 20 percent participation in another
Swiss or foreign corporation; or
(2) the Swiss company holds a participation exceeding' two million Swiss
francs in another Swiss or foreign corporation.'
To illustrate the effect of the substantial interest exemption, suppose that
Multinational A has a Swiss base company holding an interest of over 20 percent
in a German subsidiary which contributes one-fourth of the Swiss base company's
income. In this instance, there will be a reduction of one-fourth in the Swiss base
company's Federal Defense Tax. Hence, the effective income tax rate, if levied
at its maximum rate of 8.8 percent, would be reduced to 6.6 percent by this
exemption. The result should also be considered where the base company derives
all of its income from foreign permanent establishments or real estate. If so, all
of its income would be exempted from the federal income tax."0
The substantial interest exemption is therefore of great significance. It has
broad application and may have the effect of substantially reducing, if not entirely
eliminating, a base company's liability for federal income tax.
B. The Cantonal and Municipal Levels
Even more generous tax concessions are available to base companies at the
cantonal and municipal levels. In the past, cantons and municipalities competed
7 A permanent establishment in Swiss law consists of (1) a fixed place of business from
which the enterprise conducts (2) substantial activities (3) permanently. Merely operating
through an agent or using a warehouse outside of Switzerland will not qualify. TAXATION IN
SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at 75; ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., SWITZERLAND, sapra note 4,
at 93.
8 ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., SWITZERLA:ND, supra note 4, at 73.
9 See 9 EUROPEAN TAXATION 4-8 (1969); ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., SWITZERLAND,
supra note 4, at 92; EUROPEAN TAXATION, Section A, Switzerland - 1 (1974). One Swiss franc
is worth about 40e. Wall Street journal, Jan. 30, 1975 at 17, col. 5.
10 See note 9 supra.
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with each other to offer attractive tax concessions in order to bring investment to
their locality. Multinational corporations could "canton shop" to find the best
possible domicile for tax purposes." Such concessions, more difficult to find
today, have been provided in two ways. First, many cantons and municipalities
have made statutory provision for base companies which are typically given tax in-
centives so long as their business operktions remain outside Switzerland. Second,
multinational corporations have negotiated directly with cantonal and municipal
authorities for tax concessions. The type of concessions granted also varies. While
the decentralization of Swiss taxing authority among 25 cantons and hundreds
of municipalities makes it difficult to make broad generalizations, very often
the following types of concessions have been granted: (1) exemption from
cantonal and municipal income taxes and a reduced rate of cantonal and mu-
nicipal net worth taxes or (2) a lump-sum tax payable yearly.
At this point, a closer examination of cantonal and municipal taxation is
required. The basic forms of taxation remain approximately the same as at the
federal level. Both an income tax and a net worth tax are levied. But there the
similarity ends, for the overall tax burden, formula for tax assessment, and
types of concessions granted are very dissimilar.
Most Swiss cantons and municipalities have a two-part formula for deter-
mining the income or net worth tax. The first step of the formula is to apply the
basic tax rate fixed by cantonal law. The canton of Zurich, for instance, has a
progressive income tax rate which may vary from as little as 2.3 percent to as
great as 11.5 percent. This basic rate is used by both the canton and the munic-
ipality, so that the combined basic income tax rate could reach as high as 23
percent. The second step in the formula is for the canton and each municipality
within the canton to periodically establish a coefficient, or "multiple," by which
the basic rate above is multiplied to determine the actual tax. The multiple
currently used in the canton of Zurich is 1.20; the multiple used by the
municipality in which the city of Zurich is located is 1.49. Thus, the effective
maximum tax in the canton of Zurich was the basic tax of 11.5 percent multiplied
by 1.20 or 13.8 percent. Likewise, the effective maximum tax in the municipality
is 11.5 percent multiplied by 1.49 or 17.135 percent. Therefore, the maximum
combined cantonal-municipal tax on income is 30.935 percent. The same
formula is applied to determine the net worth tax. The basic net worth tax is
0.15 percent, multiplied by 1.20 for the canton and 1.49 for the municipality. 2
What is most significant here is that the effective cantonal-municipal tax,
although not nearly so burdensome as United States taxes, is nevertheless a sub-
stantial tax. It also has a substantial tax impact, for about four-fifths of all
direct taxes are collected at the cantonal-municipal levels."3 Because the cantonal
and municipal taxes impose the greatest tax burden on corporate activities,
11 Locher, Swiss Measures Against Abuse of Tax Conventions, supra note 2, at 10-11;
BNA, U.S. BusINESS OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at A-21 (1972).
12 ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., SWITZER.AND, supra note 4, at 83; EUROPEAN TAXATION,
Section A, Switzerland-29, Masterpage-2 (1974); See UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND,
FOUNDING A COMPANY IN SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at 17-18; Interviews, supra note 2.




special concessions which grant relief from these taxes are therefore of great
significance.
1. Substantial Interest Exemption
At the cantonal and municipal levels a substantial interest exemption
identical to that granted by the confederation is generally allowed. Hence,
income from another corporation in which a Swiss company owns at least a
20 percent participation or which is valued over two million Swiss francs is not
taxed.1
4
2. Pure Holding Company
The pure holding company is one of several types of statutory base companies
which have been recognized in many of the cantons of Switzerland. The statutory
base company receives tax concessions in exchange for limiting the kinds of
activities in which it may engage.
The pure holding company may be described as a type of statutory base
company whose primary or exclusive purpose is to hold stock in other corpora-
tions. So long as that remains its primary activity, it is exempt in all but two
cantons from cantonal and municipal income taxes, and, generally, a reduced
rate of net worth tax is applied."5 In 1973 in the canton of Zurich, for instance,
a pure holding company enjoyed no tax on income and a reduced net worth tax
of 0.06 percent, to which the cantonal multiple of 1.20 and the municipal
multiple of 1.49 were applied.'
6
An advantage of the pure holding company device is that no minimum
holding is required as with the substantial interest exemption. The only require-
ment is that the principal source of the pure holding company's income be gener-
ated from holdings in other corporations. Even though the extent of the pure
holding company's interest in any single company is so small that it is disqualified
from the substantial interest exemption, the income is still exempt from cantonal
and municipal income taxes.'
3. Domiciliary Company
The domiciliary company may be described as a type of statutory base
company having no business activities in Switzerland but which has its seat or
domicile there. The domiciliary company has been termed a "mailbox company,"
for it generally must not have office space or personnel in Switzerland." Some
cantons, however, grant domiciliary status even though the domiciliary company
14 9 EUROPEAN TAXATION 8 (1969); 2 EUROPEAN TAXATION 29 (1962).
15 13 EUROPEAN TAXATION 196 (1973); 2 EUROPEA-T TAXATION 30-31 (1962) ; TAXATION
IN SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at 52-53.
16 EUROPEAN TAXATION, Section A, Switzerland- 29, Masterpage -2 (1974).
17 See note 15 supra.
18 13 EUROPEAN TAXATION 196 (1973) ; 2 EUROPEAN TAXATION 31 (1962).
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has a small office and a few employees. 9 There are two common uses for the
domiciliary company: (1) invoicing sales, and (2) licensing patents.2
The invoicing of sales purpose is commonly effected as follows. Suppose
Multinational A produces components in its American plant for a product which
is assembled and sold by a foreign subsidiary in Germany. A normal procedure in
the absence of a Swiss domiciliary company would be for Multinational A to sell
directly to the German subsidiary at a profit. Corporation A would then be taxed
at United States tax rates on that profit. When the subsidiary assembled the
product and finally sold it, that profit would be taxed in Germany, another high
tax jurisdiction. The domiciliary company enables the multinational group to
concentrate its profits in the lower tax jurisdiction, namely Switzerland, by
transfer-pricing techniques. This can be accomplished by the American parent
corporation selling the goods, not directly to its German subsidiary, but by selling
them through the intermediary Swiss domiciliary company. The American parent
corporation would sell the components to the Swiss domiciliary company at near
cost so that it takes little profit in the United States. The Swiss domiciliary
company would then resell the goods to the German subsidiary at a substantially
higher price than it paid for the goods, thereby making a sizeable profit in
Switzerland. The result is that the profit has been centered in Switzerland, the
country with the lowest tax burden."
The second major use for the domiciliary corporation is in the patent licens-
in field. A multinational corporation which has patented a technological process
and desires to make it available to its subsidiaries or third parties may find the
domiciliary company device useful. Again the objective is to concentrate a
multinational's group profits in Switzerland, the low tax jurisdiction, by using
the patent licensing device as another means of skimming profit from related
companies in higher tax jurisdictions by imposing a fee or royalty on the use of the
patent. The size of the fee or royalty will vary depending on the value of the
patent and the desirability of shifting profit to Switzerland.2
4. Tax Holiday For New Enterprises
Some cantons encourage foreign corporations to establish new enterprises
by granting a tax holiday for a period of five to ten years after the enterprise has
been founded. The length of this tax holiday is negotiated with cantonal and mu-
nicipal authorities. A concordat to which all cantons have adhered limits such con-
cessions to the year of incorporation plus nine subsequent years, and the con-
cession is to be made only to nonresident aliens with no profit making activity in
19 See note 18 supra; UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND, FOUNDING A COMPA NY IN SWITZER-
LAND 27-31 (1972).
20 BNA, U.S. BUSINESS OjPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at A-24; UNION BANK
OF SWITZERLAND, FOUNDING A COMPANY IN SWITZERLAND 27 (1972); ARTHUR ANDERSEN &
Co., SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at 93-94.
21 See W. MANSER, supra note 3, at 92-108; Carley, Investigations Beset Multinational
Firhs, With Stress On Pricing, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter
cited as Carley]. Haeberli. Gewinnverlagerungen zwischen verbundenen Unternehmungen ira
internationalen Verhaitnis, 41 Archiv fur Schweizerisches Abgaberecht 209 (1972), [hereinafter
cited as Haeberli].
22 See note 21 supra.
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Switzerland for ten years prior to incorporation in Switzerland. Nevertheless,
such a concession is a powerful incentive for multinationals to establish a base
company in Switzerland.23
5. Operating Sales Company
Large multinational corporations with their principal place of business out-
side Switzerland may enjoy tax benefits without meeting the strict limitations of
a statutory base company such as a pure holding company or domiciliary
company. Since a primary objective of cantonal and municipal tax incentives
has been to strengthen and solidify Switzerland's position as a world commercial
and financial center and to bring prosperity to the Swiss economy, a corporation
with characteristics that the Swiss authorities find desirable may be able to
find certain municipalities within some cantons which will tax only a fraction of
corporate profits at the normal rate or tax the entire corporate profits on a lump-
sum basis. This tax concession is designed primarily for a multinational which
consents to establish or rejuvenate an actual operating company in remote or
underdeveloped areas of Switzerland and which produces and sells goods ana
services.24
6. Mixed Company
A novel approach which allows one to combine more than one type of tax
concession has been the creation of the combined, or multipurpose, company. The
combined company may enjoy the tax advantages of all three of the above
companies. A Swiss base company which carries on the business of an operating
sales company, domiciliary company, and holding company at the same time is
allowed in some cantons to keep separate books for each activity. Therefore, it
can have the "three-in-one" advantage of allocating the measure of income
derived from each type of activity to the appropriate special tax category in order
to take advantage of the concession granted in favor of each kind of income.'
7. Service Company
The service company is a special type of domiciliary company whose major
activity is to manage subsidiaries in Europe or throughout the world. Like other
base companies, the service company is normally not taxed on income and a
reduced rate of net worth tax is applied depending on the canton or municipality
where it is domiciled; but, unlike other base companies, the service company
employs a sizable staff and may own an office in Switzerland without losing
special tax status. The service company is designed to concentrate multina-
tional group profits in Switzerland by charging fees to related subsidiaries for
23 13 EUROPEAN TAxATION 196 (1973); 2 EUROPEAN TAXATION 28 (1962); BNA, U.S.
BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at A-21 (1972).
24 2 EUROPEAN TAAZATiON 32 (1962); BNA, U.S. BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN SWITZERLAND,
supra note 4, at A-25; Interviews, supra note 2.
25 See note 24 supra; Interviews, supra note 2.
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marketing, advertising, and technical assistance. Such fees are normally de-
ductible from the foreign subsidiary's local income taxes and are paid to the
Swiss service company to avoid taxation.26
The usefulness of the service company is limited by the practical use for
such services. According to W. A. P. Manser, "A high degree of managerial and
technical expertise must be habitual to the industry concerned, and a high
reservoir of such expertise must exist in the parent company concerned for this
to enter into consideration as a significant factor." Manser feels that only con-
panies producing a consistent flow of innovations will be in a position to obtain
consistent payments for services. Besides, he notes, a variety of natural and
official circumstances, to be more fully explained later, militate against abnormally
large charges for such services. Nevertheless, certain industries which have a
high rate of innovation, such as chemicals, oil, and electronics, may find the
service company device advantageous.2"
8. Caveat
A general caveat must be recognized to the use of these special base com-
panies to defer taxes. While it is still possible today to establish base companies
in Switzerland, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do so. In recent years
Switzerland's cantons have been saturated with foreign-held corporations. Infla-
tion, too, spurred by Switzerland's international business relationships, has caused
the federal government to take measures to protect the Swiss currency. And most
recently there has been increased concern about the great number of foreigners
taking up residence in Switzerland. Thus, the number of cantons and munic-
ipalities in which extremely favorable tax climates are to be found has declined.
Nevertheless, a substantial number of such areas still exist and can be successfully
utilized for base companies.2"
IV. Measures Against Tax Abuse
The central purpose of the establishment of a Swiss base company is to
defer taxes of foreign-source income by pooling a multinational's profits in a low
tax jurisdiction. Because this objective deprives other nations of tax revenue,
many countries, including the United States, have enacted legislation designed to
curb the attractiveness of Switzerland as a tax haven. Diplomatic pressure has
also caused the Swiss themselves to prevent flagrant abuses of their tax shelter
privileges. These actions have limited, but have not substantially impaired, the
26 2 EUROPEAN TAXATION 31-32 (1962); BNA, U.S. BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN SWrZER-
LAND, supra note 4, at A-24, A-25; ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., SWITZERLAND, Supra note 4,
at 94-95.
27 W. MANSER, supra note 3, at 93-95.
28 By its executive decision of Nov. 20, 1974 (R.O. 1974, p. 1822) amended Jan. 22,
1975, (R.O. 1975, p. 105) the federal government has temporarity ordered that Swiss banks
must levy 10% negative interest on all funds deposited in Swiss currency belonging to foreigners
residing abroad and also to corporations domiciled in Switzerland but in foreign hands and
having no economic activity in Switzerland. Because of the existence of Swiss banks outside
of Switzerland, this order does not necessarily pose a difficulty for Swiss base companies.
Interviews, supra note 2.
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basic attractiveness of Switzerland as a tax haven for multinationals. These bar-
riers to full exploitation of Swiss tax shelter privileges will now be examined.
A. Swiss Tax Decree Against Abuse of Tax Treaties
The operation of double taxation treaties becomes paramount in the opera-
tion of a Swiss base company. Stated broadly, the objective of double taxation
treaties is to assure the overall tax burden on a transfer of income across national
boundaries is no greater than that of the higher tax jurisdiction.29 But in many
specific instances, that objective is thwarted. For example, an examination of
corporate tax rates in Germany and Switzerland reveals that the maximum
German rate of 51 percent is the higher. It might therefore be logical to expect that
the combined German-Swiss tax on such a distribution of dividends from Germany
to Switzerland would be about equal to the German tax. Yet, the reality is quite
different. Operation of the German-Swiss tax treaty reduces the German tax from
51 percent to as little as 30 percent. And by operation of the substantial interest
and pure holding company tax concessions, no Swiss income tax will be imposed
and only a minimal net worth tax will be applied. Thus, the combination of a
double taxation treaty and base company status effectively reduces the tax on
this profit distribution to about one-half the tax liability which would have been
imposed, had the same transaction taken place wholly within Germany."0
Because this type of tax advantage could be gained in many countries with
which Switzerland had tax treaties, international attention focused on Switzerland
in the 1960's as a so-called "tax haven."'" Individual views varied widely. "The
fact that the tax incidence is generally lower in Switzerland than abroad," wrote
Dr. Kurt Locher, Director of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration, "does not,
of itself, entitle a foreign State to reproach Switzerland of this situation." 2
Even more outspoken was Dr. Walter Ryser:
It can hardly be disputed, however, that among those who have chosen
Switzerland, there have been some smart operators. From this fact it was
only a short step to the generalization alleging that our country was en-
couraging tax evasion.... There is certainly a great deal of exaggeration.
In any case it is difficult to see why Switzerland should be ashamed of
enjoying a tax climate which is still reasonable. On the contrary, the in-
sidious idea which seems to inspire some of our critics, according to which
the only acceptable attitude from the point of view of international co-oper-
ation is to fall into line with the law of the least favored, in pther words,
the law of the country paying the highest taxes, should be resolutely fought
against.33
29 W. MANSER, supra note 3, at 84-89.
30 ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., TAx AND TRADE Gum: GERMANY 29 (1968); 2 EUROPEAN
TAXATION 35-48 (1962); EUROPEAN TAxATIoN, Section D, REPORT ON GERMAN TAX EvASIoN
1-12 (1964).
31 Locher, supra note 2, at 10-11.
32 Id. atll.
33 Ryser. Measures Taken By Switzerland Against the Improper Use of Double Taxation
Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL BUREAU oF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SWISS MEASURES AGAINST
ABUSE OF TAX CONVENTIONS 22 (Supplement to the BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION, Vol. XVI (1963)).
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Nevertheless, in 1962 the Federal Tax Administration issued a Tax Decree con-
cerning measures against the improper use of tax conventions concluded by
Switzerland with other nations.1
4
The 1962 Tax Decree and its accompanying Circular Letter addressed to
the cantonal authorities were a result of increasing international pressure on
Switzerland to limit its preferred treatment of foreign base companies. Of no
less importance was the general state of the Swiss economy, saturated in 1961
with some 2,500 foreign-owned base companies, of which roughly 1,000 were
American-controlled and 700 were German-controlled.35 The 1962 Tax Decree
provides that a base company will not be permitted to claim the benefit of a
double-taxation treaty in two major business contexts. First, where over 50
percent of the foreign income to which treaty relief is claimed is paid to the
parent corporation as debt interest, royalties, expenses for development, advertis-
ing, sales promotion, or traveling, no treaty benefit may be obtained. If less than
50 percent of the treaty-relief income is used to satisfy such claims, then there is
no treaty abuse and the treaty relief will be granted. This is aimed particularly
at domiciliary companies holding patents and generally at any conduit company
through which income is passed to the parent corporation. Thus, a patent hold-
ing company which pays a 60 percent royalty to its United States parent on fees
received for licensing the parent's patent to subsidiaries violates the Decree and
would be required to reduce its royalties to the parent to less than 50 percent.
The second abuse arises when the base company acts not as a conduit for income,
but where it accumulates income by failing to make profit distributions to the
parent corporation. This is considered an abuse if the base company's interest-
bearing creditors' accounts total more than six times net worth, its debts to the
parent bear interest at a rate exceeding 7.5 percent, or less than 25 percent of the
accumulated income to which a tax convention applies is distributed each year.
For instance, a base company which accumulates all of its income and makes no
profit distributions could be in violation of the Decree and therefore might be
required to distribute at least one-quarter of its income in order to benefit from
Switzerland's double taxation treaties.36
So, the 1962 Tax Decree clearly limits, but does not severely diminish, the
usefulness of the Swiss base company. Within the above limitations there are still
considerable tax savings to be gained. This is evidenced by the fact that in the
nine months after the issuance of the 1962 Tax Decree, the number of holding
companies in Switzerland rose from over 4,400 to about 5,2403
7
34 Decree of the Federal Council Concerning Measures Against the Improper Use of Tax
Conventions Concluded By the Swiss Confederation (of December 14, 1962), in INTERNATIONAL
BUREAU OF FIsCAr DOCUMENTATION, Swiss MEASURES AGAINST ABusE OF TAx CONVENTIONS
33-36 (Supplement to the BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, Vol. XVI
(1963)).
35 Locher, supra note 2, at 10-11.
36 See note 34 supra; Interviews, supra note 2; Circular Letter, Federal Tax Administration,
December 31, 1962, in INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SWISS MEASURES
AGAINST ABUSE OF TAX CONVENTIONS 37-50 (Supplement to the BULLETIN FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, Vol. XVI (1963)).
37 EUROPEAN TAXATION, Section D, REPORT ON GERMAN TAX EvAsIoN 8-9 (1964).
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B. The Swiss-German Double Taxation Treaty
A most recent development in the gradual tightening of restrictions designed
to curb the abusive useof Swiss base companies is the 1972 Swiss-German Double
Taxation Treaty. This new treaty, which amends the Swiss-German Double
Taxation Treaty of 1931, reflects many of the forms of restrictions of the 1962
Swiss Tax Decree Against Treaty Abuse. Its series of new provisions tackles the
problem of German firms establishing Swiss base companies to diminish their
German tax liability. Its provisions are significant because they show the trend
toward limiting, though not substantially impairing, the effectiveness of Switzer-
land as a tax haven. The treaty is also significant because next to the United
States, there are more German-controlled Swiss base companies than any others.
Finally, the treaty's provisions have a direct impact on an American multinational
doing business in Germany and establishing a Swiss base company to save on
German taxes.3"
Germany has a split-rate income tax on dividends. There is a basic 15
percent income tax upon the corporation when it makes a dividend dis-
tribution. Subsequently, the dividend is subject to a second tax in the hands of
the recipient. If the recipient is another corporation which does not distribute
the dividend to its shareholders, then the recipient corporation pays a supple-
mentary tax of 36 percent. Hence, the total effective German tax rate is 51
percent. However, by operation of the old double taxation treaty with Switzer-
land, dividends paid by a German subsidiary to a Swiss holding company were
subject only to the initial tax of 15 percent plus a withholding tax of 15 percent.
A higher 25 percent withholding tax was applied if the holding company owned
at least one-quarter of the German subsidiary's stock. Thereafter, the dividend
was beyond German tax jurisdiction in a Swiss base company which qualified
for exemption from Swiss income tax and was liable for only the minor net worth
tax. Thus, the Swiss base company device saved 11-21 percent on German taxes.
It was estimated that some 8,000 Swiss base companies were connected with
German businesses to take advantage of this arrangement at the time of the 1972
treaty amendment.3 9
The amended treaty incorporates aspects of the 1962 Tax Decree almost
verbatim and adds some new weapons, but does not dramatically change the
relative advantage to be gained from ownership of a German subsidiary through
a Swiss base company. Requirements similar to the 1962 Tax Decree are
recited in order for the benefits of the Swiss-German tax treaty to apply. These
make it necessary that a base company limit interest-bearing creditors' accounts to
six times net worth, that its interest obligations not exceed the average rate of debt
interest, that not more than 50 percent of the corresponding base company's
income be used to satisfy claims of a parent corporation, and that at least 25
percent of income to which the Swiss-German tax convention applies be distrib-
uted each year. Some of the treaty's new limitations provide that: A German
38 See text of treaty in EUROPEAN TAXATION, Section C, Germany-Switzerland at 1-22
(1973) ; Locher, supra note 2, at 10; Interviews, supra note 2.
39 See note 38 supra; 11 EUROPEAN TAxATioN at 1/213-1/221 (1971); CCH 1974
COMMON MARKET REP'., supra note 4, at 23,338-23,347.
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citizen taking up residence in Switzerland who has been subject to German
taxes for five years may be subjected to German taxes for five years after he
vacates Germany and moves to Switzerland; a Swiss base company that deals
with one of its related companies in Germany must treat its transactions with that
company at arm's length; profits of a related company managed from Switzerland
may be included in the profits of the controlled German corporation; and
dividends will be subject to a 25 percent withholding tax if paid by a German
subsidiary to a Swiss holding company controlling at least 20 percent of the vot-
ing power of the German company (thereby qualifying for the Swiss substantial
interest exemption) .40
The new amendments to the German-Swiss tax treaty may be viewed as
evidence of the increasing trend toward the delimitation of the benefits granted to
base companies. The current trend is clearly in the direction of enforcing a rule
of arm's length transactions in the sphere of international taxation. Yet, it is
significant that the German tax can still be limited to 30-40 percent with proper
planning. While the new Swiss-German tax treaty limits the benefits of a Swiss
base company, the tax savings to be gained remain substantial.
C. The Swiss-United States Double Taxation Treaty
While a major purpose of the Swiss base company is to accumulate income,
it has been demonstrated that Swiss tax abuse legislation requires that some of
that accumulated income be distributed. Whenever a profit distribution is made
from a Swiss base company to its American parent, the terms of the Swiss-United
States Tax Treaty enter into force.
In general, the Treaty provides that dividends paid by a Swiss base company
to its American parent are subject to a maximum Swiss tax of 15 percent, which
may be reduced to just 5 percent if the shareholder is a corporation controlling
95 percent of the voting power of the Swiss base company. Likewise, the maxi-
mum Swiss tax on interest paid by the Swiss base company to its American
creditor is 5 percent. Finally, royalties and other consideration for the right to use
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other similar property are exempt from
Swiss taxation."'
40 See note 38 supra.
41 Convention With the Swiss Federation For the Avoidance of Double Taxation With
Respect to Taxes On Income, May 24, 1951, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 1751; EUROPEAN TAXATION,
Section C, Switzerland-U.S.A. 1-6. In order to receive the treaty benefits, a taxpayer must file
for a partial refund of the Anticipatory Tax (Verrechnungssteuer; imp~t anticipi), a withhold-
ing tax of 30 percent on any distribution of profit by a Swiss corporation to shareholders,
whether described as a dividend or not. The tax is collected within thirty days of the distribution
but may be fully reclaimed by a Swiss individual or corporation receiving the dividend by show-
ing that the payment is includable in taxable income so that it will be subject to the Defense
Tax. If the dividends are paid to the recipient outside the country, then the recipient's profits
are not subject to domestic Swiss taxes. Hence, as a rule no refund is made in the absence of a
double taxation treaty with the recipient's country. In this way, taxation of dividends of a Swiss
company distributed to a foreign parent corporation captures profits which would otherwise have
escaped taxation in Switzerland. ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., SwITzmRAN, upra note 4, at
111-12; TAXATION IN SWITZERLAND, supra note 4, at 66-69. Switzerland has double taxation
treaties with Antigua, Austria, Barbados, British Honduras, Denmark, Dominica, Falkland
Islands, Finland, France. Gambia, Germany, Grenada, Ireland, Japan, Malawi, Montserrat,
Netherlands, Norway, Paistan, Rhodesia, St. Christopher, St. Lucia, Seychelles, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden Trinidad, United Kingdom, United States. and Zambia. EUROPEAN TAXATION,
Section C, Switzerland 1-3 (1974).
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These generally favorable tax concessions must be considered in light of
Article IV of the Treaty, which requires that transfers of profit between related
Swiss and American companies be at arm's length:
Where an enterprise of one of the contracting States, by reason of its
participation in the management or the financial structure of an enterprise
of the other contracting State, makes with or imposes on the latter, in their
commercial or financial relations, conditions different from those which
would be made with an independent enterprise, any profits which would
normally have accrued to one of the enterprises, but by reason of those
conditions have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enter-
prise and taxed accordingly.4 2
Hence, if the American parent transacts its affairs with a Swiss base company so
as to manipulate extraordinarily high profits to Switzerland which otherwise
would have flowed to the American parent, the Treaty gives United States
authorities the power to tax those profits, even though the profits have not
reached the American parent. This type of provision is indicative of the modem
trend in sophisticated tax laws of developed countries such as the United States,
France, and Germany.43 The thrust of these laws is that taxation of a foreign
transaction should depend not upon whether there has been an artificial transfer
designed to avoid taxation, but rather upon what the companies would have
done in an arm's length transaction.
D. The United States Internal Revenue Code
While this note is directed primarily at Swiss taxation and therefore cannot
detail the United States tax consequences of the use of a base company, it is
important to briefly mention provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which
have an immediate impact on the use of a Swiss base company.
United States income taxes have traditionally been applied to the worldwide
income of American corporations, but no tax was applied to American-controlled
foreign subsidiaries and base companies which are creatures of foreign and not
American law. Therefore, the profits of a Swiss subsidiary were generally deferred
from U.S. income tax until paid to the American parent corporation. Now two
42 Convention With the Swiss Federation For the Avoidance of Double Taxation With
Respect to Taxes On Income, May 24, 1951, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 1751; EUROPEAN TAXAToN,
Section C, Switzerland-U.S.A. at 2. To a similar effect, see art. III, § 3 which states:
Where an enterprise of one of the contracting States is engaged in trade or business in
the territory of the other contracting State through a permanent establishment
situated therein, there shall be attributed to such permanent establishment the indus-
trial or commercial profits which it might be expected to derive if it were an inde-
pendent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar
conditions and dealing at arm's length with the enterprise of which it is a permanent
establishment. Id.
43 Its statutory counterparts are found in the laws of eight West European nations: Belgium,
Denmark. France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Sweden and West Germany. Haeberli, supra
note 22, at 216, n. 11. He also notes that despite these laws it is extremely difficult for tax
authorities to evaluate the shifting of profits among a multinational group. Haeberli, supra note
22, at 217. For a discussion of French and American law on this point, see Note, Assault on




major exceptions exist to that general rule in the Internal Revenue Code, § 482
and Subpart F, which threaten such deferral techniques."
The terms of § 482, similar to Article IV of the Swiss-United States Treaty,
are designed to cause American corporations to deal with a base company on an
arm's length basis. The section provides that the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue may reallocate income between affiliated companies in order to more
dearly reflect the income of each entity. Hence, § 482 can be used to prevent an
American parent company from abusing the transfer-pricing mechanism by
shifting profits from the U.S. parent to a Swiss base company.45
Subpart F, an extremely complex set of provisions which grapple with the
deferral of U.S. income taxes through the use of a "controlled foreign corpora-
tion," generally provide that the undistributed profits of a base company created
to avoid United States taxes can be indirectly taxed in certain circumstances by
assessing the American shareholders of the parent corporation controlling the
base company with a "constructive dividend." A constructive dividend can be
imposed only where the base company is a controlled foreign corporation, a com-
pany directly or indirectly owned by United States persons holding over 50
percent of its stock. Even then a constructive dividend can be imposed only on
shareholders with 10 percent or more .of the voting power of the controlled foreign
corporation. Thus, it is possible that a foreign base company can be completely
owned by U.S. shareholders and not be subject to the imposition of a constructive
dividend if the voting stock is equally divided between eleven or more unrelated
shareholders."'
These and other U.S. income tax consequences must be carefully scrutinized
in determining whether an American multinational corporation should establish
a base company. Inclusion of a Subpart F "constructive dividend" in the income
44 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 482.
45 Precisely what is an "arm's length" transfer price can be extremely difficult to establish:
A company doesn't change a price overnight by a huge amount so that everyone
notices, says one investigator for a European government. "That company increases a
price little by little, over a period of time, till it gets what it wants. And in these days
of rapidly fluctuating prices, it's easy to slip that kind of thing through."
The so-called "simple" formula of cost plus a margin of profit isn't so simple in many
cases, the European investigator adds. "The main problem," he adds, "is determining
the costs, especially if the product is highly complex and manufactured in a distant
country. And the allocation of research, administrative costs and other overhead to any
given product may be largely arbitrary. You almost have to take the company's word
for it." Carley, supra note 22.
See B. BITrKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, 15.06 (1971) ; Kragen, Avoidance of International Double Taxation Arising From
Section 482 Reallocations, 60 CL. L. REv. 1493 (1972); Seghers, How "Reasonable" Pricing
Can Defeat An IRS Reallocation Under Section 482, 35 J. TAX. 232 (1971); Hamlin, Correct
Allocations Under Section 482 Are Still Difficult Despite New Regs., 33 J. TAX. 358 (1970).
See generally Symposium: Multinational Enterprise, 11 SAN Dmoo L. Rzv. 1-285 (1973).
46 See R. RHOADES, 1 INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS (1973);
B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS,
supra note 45, at 17.30-17.33; W. GiFFoRU, INTERNAIONAL TAX PLANNING (1974);
M. LANOER & R. POvELL, FOREIGN TAX HAVENs (1973); B. BITTxER & L. EBB, U.S. TAXATION
OF FOREION PERSONS (1971); Jenks, Taxation of Foreign Income, 42 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 537
(1974); Stone, United States Tax Policy Toward Foreign Earnings of Multinational Corpora-
tions, 42 GEo. WASH. L. Rnv. 557 (1974); Bandy, Ways to Avoid Current Taxation of Subpart




of its American shareholders, for instance, could destroy the usefulness of the base
company. With proper planning, however, the impact of these provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code can be minimized.
E. Swiss Tax Harmonization Proposals
In addition to the tightening of income tax laws and double-taxation treaty
provisions by foreign countries, there are current proposals within Switzerland
to harmonize the tax laws among the cantons and municipalities which might
lead to reduction in the variety or quality of tax concessions.
In 1968 the cantons instructed the Ritschard Committee to draft a proposed
law on direct taxes to be used by the cantons in a movement toward tax harmo-
nization.' The Committee made a multitude of proposals for increasing the
efficiency and fairness of the tax laws but did not particularly focus on the
question of modification of tax concessions granted to base companies. However,
it was suggested that a necessary consequence of any tax harmonization move-
ment would be the destruction of the provincial nature of the present Swiss tax
system upon which the tax concessions granted to base companies depends. Yet,
the Committee did not indicate an attitude adverse to tax concessions. On the
contrary, it suggested that pure holding companies remain exempt from income
tax but be more precisely defined.48 More recently, however, it has been sug-
gested that domiciliary companies should lose their tax privileges. But on this as
well as other proposals to limit such privileges, the last word has not yet been
spoken.
49
It must be remembered that the cantons still retain potent political influence
so that it is unlikely that drastic changes in the overall tax structure will sud-
denly transpire. It would not be expected that the Committee called by the
cantons, the primary benefactors of the present system of tax concessions, would
propose that such concessions be scrapped. If such a change is to take place,
then, it will be at the behest of other nations objecting to Switzerland as a tax
haven. There is no indication today that Switzerland will change its stance to
meet those demands, for there is a natural hesitancy to change a tax system which,
when connected with Switzerland's commercial and financial advantages, has
been a recognized component of its prosperity. 0
47 13 EUROPEAN TAXATION 202-08 (1973); Interviews, supra note 2.
48 See note 47. supra.
49 Tax harmonization proposals anticipate preservation of the holding company, but a
current proposal advocates an end to the domiciliary company. See H~hn, Die Harmoniserung
der direkten Steuern des Bundes und der Kantone, 42 ARcErlv FUR ScOwEiz:ERMsHES
ABOABaREcHT 125 (1973). Dr. Kurt Locher, Director of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration,
has stated, however, that the domiciliary company should not be harshly criticized, since it is a
sensible device for avoiding double taxation where tax relief is not otherwise provided in a double
taxation treaty. But, he adds, "It loses its justification, though, if under an existing double
taxation treaty the foreign treaty partner reduces its taxes, and on account of the domiciliary
privilege in Switzerland the profit nevertheless bears no cantonal or municipal, but only federal,
income tax." Locher, Steuerprobleme der multinationalen Unternehmungen, 41 ARcrnv run
SCHWEIZERXSCHEs AEGABRECHT 417, 422 (1973). See also note 47 supra.
50 See note 49 supra.
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V. Conclusion
The Swiss base company is an attractive mechanism for deferral of an
American multinational corporation's taxes by acting as a central clearing house
interposed between the American parent and its foreign subsidiaries. The
potential for tax savings has been extraordinary because of Switzerland's low
average rate of corporate taxation, extensive network of double-taxation treaties,
and, especially, the cantonal and municipal tax concessions providing special
privileges and even exemption from taxation to foreign held base companies. In
recent years, the United States and other nations have applied diplomatic
pressure and enacted new laws to limit the usefulness of the Swiss base company.
Switzerland has issued the 1962 Tax Decree against treaty abuse and is studying
proposals to harmonize cantonal and municipal taxes, making it probable that
the sphere of tax saving activities which a Swiss base company may perform will
remain limited. Despite such limitations, the Swiss base company remains an at-
tractive device for American multinational corporations wishing to defer taxes
and have a pool of assets which can be shifted among foreign subsidiaries.
W. David Braun
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